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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING,

]
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

vs.

;

CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING,

]

Case No. 930659-CA
Trial Court No. 842022686
Defendant/Respondent.

]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The modification of the Divorce Decree from which this
appeal is taken was signed by the Court on September 2, 1993.
The Notice of Appeal was filed September 29, 1993.
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et
seq., Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-1 et seq., and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct.
App.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a modification of divorce decree
signed and entered by Judge Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred, given the occupation Mr.

Welling maintained during the marriage of the parties which he
specifically changed following the divorce to assume the new
responsibility for a second family which now requires him to work
substantially more hours per week and assume more responsibility
and risk with the extra money received based on commissions in

setting Mr, Welling f s earnings for the purpose of setting child
support for the first family at $7,000 per month rather than the
$3,000 a month he would have earned had he remained in the same
type of employment with the same general duties and a normal 40hour working week he was doing at the time of the divorce.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Welling

any attorney fees and costs without finding she was unable to pay
her own attorney fees and costs, especially in light of the
arrearage judgment for child support based on the retroactive
date of the order which would have given her sufficient money to
pay her attorney and costs.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a modification of a divorce decree.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties were originally divorced on October 24, 1984.

A

modification of the divorce decree was entered September 2, 1993,
and an appeal of the child support and costs of court was filed
September 29, 1993.
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT
The trial was held on December 2, 1992.

After the

presentation of the evidence and the hearing of testimony of the
parties and Mr. Welling f s supervisor, the trial court found that
Mr. Welling f s income for the last three years had averaged $7,000
per month.

The court further found as immaterial the fact that

Mr. Welling had maintained a job during the marriage which
required the normal 40-hour week and generated $22,000 per year
»2-

in earnings and because of a conscious choice he made to be able
to assume the responsibility for a second family had changed to a
job that required a minimum of 60 hours per week and had a base
salary of $33,000 which was comparable to his prior earnings but
generated substantially more earnings based on commissions that
were dependant on the risk of success and the greatly increased
working hours per week.

The court further found Mrs. Welling was

voluntarily under-employed and imputed her wages at $1,075 per
month based on the prior job she maintained.

The court found the

effective date of the order to be February 1, 1992, thus creating
an arrearage from that date to the date of the hearing.
The court found that Mr. Welling?s earnings represented 87%
of the earnings of the parties and ordered him to pay 87% of the
attorney fees and costs incurred, or his own attorney fees and
costs plus $590 of attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Welling ? s
attorney.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced on October 24, 1984.

2.

During the course of the marriage, two children were

born to the parties, to-wit:

Michael Welling, born October 30,

1982, and Brandon Welling, born April 25, 1984.
3.

That during this marriage and at the time of the

divorce, Mr. Welling was employed as a management trainee at J.C.
Penney f s where he earned $22,593 in 1984, the year of the
divorce.

(See Exhibit "A" admitted at the hearing and attached

hereto as Exhibit 1, and Trial Transcript, page 8, lines 5-16. )
-3-

4.

That for the next two years, Mr. Welling made less than

he did in 1984 while trying different jobs but paid his child
support regularly and paid all of the marital debts that he had
assumed in the divorce.
5.

(See Exhibit 1.)

That Mr. Welling wanted to earn additional money to

support a new wife and family, but rather than choose a regular
full-time job with a part-time job to supplement his earnings, he
began working as a traveling salesman which required at least 60
hours per week with the added responsibility of travel with a
guaranteed base salary to protect his first family with all the
excess earnings conditioned on performance in the form of a
bonus.
6.

That Mr. Welling remarried in 1990 and is the father of

a child born in 1992 as a result of that relationship.

He has

continued to make approximately $33,000 per year as a base
guaranteed salary plus bonuses based on the extra hours of work
and successful performance.
7.

(See Exhibit 1.)

That the other salesmen working for the same company

doing the same general work make between $50,000 and $60,000
based on their base plus bonuses with an average of 60-hours per
week work.
8.

(See Trial Transcript, page 45, lines 1-6.)

That Mrs. Welling has worked one and a half years since

the divorce and spent the balance of the time going to college.

-4-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

That as a result of the trial court's failure to

adequately differentiate the earnings of Mr. Welling between a
base salary of $33,000 which he is guaranteed and comparable with
the regular full-time job he performed during the marriage of the
parties by which their children would have been supported had the
parties stayed married and the excess earnings in the form of a
bonus generated by his increased efforts and assumption of risk
in making those earnings, which he assumed after the divorce to
be able to support his new family, the court improperly set child
support using a wrong income earnings for Mr. Welling.
2.

That the court erred in awarding Mrs. Welling $590 of

attorney fees and costs when there was no evidence of her need
and where she was awarded an arrearage judgment large enough to
cover those costs because of the retroactive nature of the order.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING ALL OF MR.
WELLING 1 S SALARY, MUCH OF WHICH WAS GENERATED BY
WORKING EXCESS HOURS PER WEEK AND BY ASSUMING
RISKS IN HOW HE WAS PAID AT A NEW JOB SPECIFICALLY
TAKEN AFTER THE DIVORCE SO HE COULD SUPPORT A
SECOND FAMILY.
Utah law is very clear that for the purposes of setting
child support, "income from earned income sources is limited to
the equivalent of one full-time job." (emphasis added)
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2).

-5-

Utah Code

There is no legislative definition or Utah court decisions
that clarify what is meant by "equivalent of one full-time job."
Legislative history is also silent on the meaning of that
phrase, except the term "40-hour" which was included in Sub. HB
203 between the word "one" and the word "full-time" as it passed
the House in 1989, was deleted by a voice vote on the floor of
the Senate on the 44th day of the session by a motion of the
undersigned just prior to the bill being approved by the full
Senate.

(See Utah State Senate Journal 1989, page 754.)

amendment was later accepted by the House.

This

There is no

explanation on the record for the purpose and intent of this
amendment, but the undersigned was a member of the Child Support
Guidelines Task Force chaired by Judge Judith Billings that
created the basis from which these guidelines were created.

(See

Child Support Guidelines, Utah Law Review 1990, beginning page
859.)

The undersigned made the motion because the "40-hour"

limitation was too narrow for jobs where over 40 hours were
regularly expected and worked during a marriage which established
a lifestyle of support of income upon which the family and the
children were funded.

On the other hand, the term "equivalent"

limited the term "full-time work" to a reasonable comparable to
what other people normally do to support their family.

If only

"full-time job" had been used, there could be no such comparison.
If a type of job only required 10 hours a week or even 90 hours a
week, it could be still considered "full-time" but certainly not

-6-

equivalent to other jobs unless the time set to earn the wages
are equivalent to what a 40-hour week would normally generate.
The Court is left to the standard rules of statutory
construction, that is:

the plain meaning of the term taken

within the context of the statute involved as historically
applied and which fosters good social policy should be followed.
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984).
For most people not self-employed, "full-time" would normally be
measured by 40 hours.

Generally anyone who works for another is

paid extra for anything over 40 hours as overtime because time
beyond that is not generally expected or required.
It is submitted that "equivalent of one full-time job"
should generally be 40 hours unless the job in question normally
requires a limited number of hours beyond that.

The historical

work pattern established and expected during the marriage should
be considered.

In other words, if a parent normally works four

hours of overtime per week during the marriage where such
overtime is expected or required and is generally available, that
should be the standard.

If the parent is working an excessive

number of hours per week, say ten or more, especially in an
effort to earn additional moneys to try to save the marriage, the
court should follow the more reasonable level of the 40-hour week
rather than hold the worker to the extraordinary schedule which
is assured for a short specific purpose.

The object of the large

number of hours--to save the marriage--is now lost to the divorce
and the short duration of the excess work should not be a penalty
-7-

to the spouse as he tries to begin a new life.

If a parent

voluntarily changes occupations after the divorce, so that he
works extraordinary longer hours and makes more money to be able
to assume the responsibility for a new family, he should be able
to do that as long as his first family is protected by child
support based on the same earnings they were receiving during the
marriage.

Each parent should be able to voluntarily help

whomever they want just as they could choose to give one child
more during their marriage.
This statutory policy to cap or limit the number of hours a
person must work to support his children after a divorce is
consistent with two other principles of law in this area.

There

is no limit on the income to be considered if it comes from nonearned sources.

In other words, if the parent inherited money

that generated income, the full amount could be considered by the
court in setting child support.

This appears reasonable because

those earnings are not set by time of effort, which is limited to
everyone.

Also, if a person chooses to work a 40-hour job plus a

second part-time job of 20 hours, only the income from the first
would be considered.

It does not make any rational sense to say,

but if instead of two separate jobs, a parent expanded one job
from 40 to 60 hours, the full amount in earnings are included to
set child support.
It is difficult to compare this provision with the laws of
other states because the exact wording, approach and policy
behind them are different.

("Child Support Guidelines, 1990 ULR,
-8-

page 859). This article, written by Judge Billings after she
chaired the Utah Judicial Council's Child Support Guidelines Task
Force, gives the considerations by the group in creating the work
product which became Sub HB 203 of the 1989 session.

Judge

Billings explains what approach the task force accepted and why:
The Task Force ultimately decided that the
guidelines that considered both parents' incomes
would be perceived as more fair and would better
reflect the underlying policy that both parents
should contribute to the well-being of their
children.
Page 888.
With this approach, the statute protects the children and
the parents by capping earned income at the equivalent of a fulltime job and by setting a floor by imputing wages for
unemployment and under-employment.
Other states have faced the challenges of a non-custodial
parent whose unusual rigorous work schedule has set income at an
abnormally high level.

In re Marriage of Simpson, 14 Cal.

Rept.2d 411, 841 P.2d 931 (Cal. 1992).

The Supreme Court of

California acknowledged that a reasonable work regimen, not an
extraordinary regimen, should be the goal is applying the
guidelines under the statutory term of "earning capacity", which
is certainly less restructive than "equivalent of one full-time
job."
The record in this case is not as clear as intended because
the trial court limited much of the case by deciding the issues
during the opening statements and allowed much by proffer (page

-9-

30).

The trial court had clearly made up its mind during the

opening statement that the full earnings of Mr. Welling were
going to be included, regardless of how they were made and the
reason for his extraordinary work schedule as long as it was from
one employer.

The task in such a case is not easy or clear, but

the California Court set forth the guidelines we should follow:
A reasonable work regimen, as opposed to an
extraordinary regimen, however, is not readily or
precisely determined and is dependent upon all
relevant circumstances, including the choice of
job available within a particular occupation,
working hours, and working conditions.
Established employment norms, such as the standard
40-hour work week, are not controlling but are
pertinent to this determination. In certain
occupations a normal work week necessarily will
require in excess of 40 hours or occasional
overtime and thus perhaps an amount of time and
effort which may be considered reasonable under
the circumstances. A regimen requiring excessive
hours or continuous, substantial overtime,
however, generally should be considered
extraordinary.
Page 937.
The point missed by the trial court is that Mr. Welling
carried a traditional full-time 40-hour job during the marriage
of the parties.

It was what he had been trained to do and was

the choice of the parties upon which to base their lifestyle
expectancy for the rest of their married life.

They begat

children and proceeded with that expectation until the divorce.
Defendant left that job and voluntarily secured another type of
employment to earn the money necessary to pay all the marital
debts and still maintain his support payments.

He made sure the

children were supported as ordered and gave extra support as he
-10-

was able.

He then developed a new occupation with the risk that

his salary other than the base was no longer guaranteed and his
work schedule would clearly exceed the normal 40-hours by an
extraordinary amount.

He did this by choice so he could assume

responsibility for a new family.

The trial court rejected this

position at the beginning of the hearing and made it clear that
he was not going to allow this father that choice.

The trial

court made the children from the first marriage beneficiaries of
this extraordinary work pattern.

Even Mr. Welling f s offer in

settlement of accepting a $65,000 annual salary as his expected
earnings so the commitments of his second family could be met was
not accepted by the court.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT WITHOUT A FINDING THAT SHE
WAS IN NEED OF SUCH AN AWARD.
An award of attorney fees at a trial must be based on
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fee.
1991).

See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App.

The trial court failed to address Mrs. Welling?s need.

In fact, she was awarded an arrearage judgment solely based on
the retroactive effective date of the order.

The final papers

signed September 2, 1993, some nine months after the hearing,
reflect that Mrs. Welling after the December 2, 1992 hearing was
paid $4,170 on the arrearage of $7,711, leaving a balance owing

-11-

of $3,541, thus providing her with ample funds to pay the $1,000
in attorney fees and costs the court found reasonable.
CONCLUSION
This case will allow the Utah law to be clarified as to what
is meant by the limit on earned income to the equivalent of one
full-time job.

This case shows a man who has changed his

occupation after the divorce and voluntarily assume an
extraordinary schedule of hours worked and risks of salary
assumed.

This is certainly more than the equivalent of one full-

time job both by past work schedule and what is normal person
expected.

His first family should be supported as they were

accustomed and expected by his base salary but to punish this
father's sacrifice to support a second family is not equitable.
Mrs. Welling has funds to pay her own attorney fees and costs and
the court made no finding otherwise.

Therefore, this Court

should reduce Mr. Wellingfs earned income to $33,000 per year his
guaranteed base for the purpose of setting child support and find
that no award of attorney fees and costs to Mrs. Welling should
be made.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

f

day of February, 1994.

HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

IiYLEj W.

Attorney
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HILLYAR©

for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, postpaid, to the
day of February, 1994:
David M. Cole
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
330 North Main Street
P. 0. Box 320
Kaysville, UT 84037
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

#LE ¥. HI JYARD
ttorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Lyle W-- -illyard #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610

ATTACHMENT A

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING,
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 842022686

CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING,
Defendant.

BASED on the Court's Memorandum Decision dated the 6th day
of August, 1993, it is hereby Ordered:
1.

That Exhibit A of Defendant's Petition be modified as

shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit D and be submitted to the Court for
signature, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to this order
and by this signing shall become entered by the court as its
order in the December 2, 1992, hearing.
2.

That Defendant's request for additional attorneys fees

and costs is denied and Plaintiff's request that attorneys fees
be abated is also denied.
3.

That Defendant's request for a wage assignment is
^

denied.
Dated this

^

day of "^glfiftf^1993.
BY THE COUF

LOW
District Court Judge

MICROFILMED

OATE:

.;~>fc

P/V??
*G

21993
s>. n

t
OA^5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's attorney,
Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 300,
Ogden, Utah 84403, this /3

day of August, 19£3.
Secretary

• Vf

e:\lwh\pl\welling.orl
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EXHIBIT 'A1
Lyle W. Hillyard #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

VS.

CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING,

Civil No. 842022686

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on
Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce before the
Honorable Judge Gordon J* Low in the above-entitled court on the
2nd day of December, 1992, at 9 o'clock a.m.

Defendant was

personally present and represented by Jean Robert Babilis of Jean
Robert Babilis & Associates and the Plaintiff was personally
present and represented by Lyle W. Hillyard of Hillyard, Anderson
& Olsen.

The Judge having heard testimony taken, the Court does

make and enter the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded

one-half, or five (5) weeks, of the children's summer vacation.
The court eliminates the first and last week of summer, which
leaves ten (10) weeks to be divided equally between the parties

21993

The same formula applies to Christmas and other major holidays*
In addition, the court finds that due to the great geographical
distance between the parties, the Plaintiff should be awarded
visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant
reasonable notice of no less than two weeks where possible, when
he is in town*

The parties should generally follow the

recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached
visitation guidelines*
2.

the court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the

use of her pre-marital surname, to-wit:
3.

MORRIS.

The court finds that the Plaintiff provided the

Defendant with a 1988 Oldsmobile in exchange for the right to
claim the parties' two children as dependents for tax purposes
for the years through 1990 through 1995.
4.

The court finds that the Plaintiff's income has averaged

$84,000.00 over the past three years, and therefore, that is the
figure to be used when calculating child support for the parties'
two minor children.

The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed, and

the court finds that she is capable of earning $1,075.00 for
purposes of computing child support.

The court finds that the

Plaintiff has remarried, has a child born as issue of his current
marriage, and incurs work-related day care expenses.
5.

The court finds that the Defendant should be granted a

judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven
Hundred Eleven Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00) for child support
arrearages from February 1, 1992 through and including the month
2

of December, 1992, which represents the amount above and beyond
the original child support order of $300,00 per month, which has
been made by the Plaintiff.
6.

The court finds that the Defendant's attorney's fees are

approximately One Thousand Dollars and no/100 ($1,000.00), and
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees are Two Thousand Dollars and
no/100 ($2,000.00).

The Plaintiff earns eighty seven percent

(87%) of the parties' combined gross incomes, and therefore
should pay (87%) of the attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting
this action, and therefore, Defendant is granted a judgment
against the Plaintiff of $590.00 for attorney's fees.
Based on the above and foregoing, and for good cause
appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Decree of Divorce entered October 24, 1984, may be modified as
follows:
1.

The Plaintiff is awarded one-half, or five (5) weeks, of

the children's summer vacation.

The Plaintiff is awarded

visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant
reasonable notice of at least two weeks where possible of when he
will be in town.

The parties should generally follow the

recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached
visitation guidelines.
2.

The Defendant is awarded the use of her pre-marital

surname, to-wit:
3.

MORRIS.

The Plaintiff is awarded the right to claim the parties

two children as dependents for tax purposes for the years through
3

1990 through 1995 in exchange for a 1988 Oldsmobile.

Thereafter,

the tax dependency of the children shall belong to the Defendant.
The Plaintiff may have the option to buy the exemptions, so long
as he is current and timely in his child support payments each
year, by paying to the Defendant the tax loss by not being able
to claim the children on her and her future husband's tax returns
each year.

The parties are ordered to exchange tax returns and

indicate their incomes and work histories.
4.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support in the sum

of Five Hundred Dollars and 50/100 ($500.50) per month per child,
or One Thousand One Dollar and no/100 ($1,001.00) per month,
beginning with the month of February, 1992. Said child support
is due one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each
month, and shall terminate when each child turns eighteen (18)
years of age or graduate with their regular high school class,
whichever occurs last.
5.

The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the

Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven
Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00), minus Four Thousand One Hundred
Seventy Dollars and no/100 ($4,170.00) which he paid in December,
1992, as and for child support arrearages from February 1, 1992,
to and including the month of December, 1992, which represents
the amount above and beyond the original child support order of
$300.00 per month, for a total judgment of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Forty One Dollars and no/100 ($3,541.00).

4

6.

The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the

Plaintiff in the amount of Five Hundred Ninety Dollars and no/100
($590.00) as and for a contribution toward Defendant's attorney's
fees and costs in bringing this action.
7.

All prior orders of this court not modified herein shall

remain in full force and effect.
Dated this _^{

day
BY THE COUR'

)'RD0ft J/ LOW
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's
attorney, Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite
300, Ogden, Utah 84403, this

day of August, 1993.
Secretary
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ATTACHMENT B

Exhibit "A"
Income History
Wendell
Penney's
1984

Lever
1985

Base Salary
Bonus

$22,593.08
0

$18,000
3.615

$19,000
2.422

$29,000
4.100

Total

$22,593.08

$21,615

$21,422

$33,100

Lever
1986

Olympic
1987

Ethicon
1988

Ethicon
1989

Ethicon
1990

Ethicon
1991

Base Salary
Bonus

$29,000
9.003

$28,424
12.565

$31,304
32.815

$33,358
39.120

Total

$38,003

$40,989

$64,119

$72,478

1992 YTD
Base Salary
Bonus

$ 32,640
66.890

Total

$ 99,530

